Friday, April 18, 2008

Pizza.com Stolen From Some Schlep for Just $2.6 Million

From Slashdot:

the pizza.com domain name was sold for a ridiculous $2.6m bucks. Can there be a bubble and a recession at the same time, or do the two cancel each other out like Penn & Teller?  

Here’s a recent picture of the submitter:

$2.6 Million is Ridiculous . . . ridiculously low.

Any big brand that didn’t buy it (Pizza Hut, Dominos) missed the boat. Even without being in the pizza industry, it’s easy to see how to turn pizza.com into a huge business.

Some (like the slashdot subby) balk at the price but whoever bought pizza.com for just $2.6 Million basically stole it. That’s so cheep for such an incredible domain name that I almost feel bad for the guy that sold it. Fortunately, he’s absolutely ecstatic about the price - so it’s a win-win for everyone involved.

Nice Catch from Rachel Lucas:

Megan Carpenter's Glamour magazine blog asks "Why are all the big political bloggers men?," and in the process says this:

Ezra Klein agreed with Amy about the ghettoization of female voices, noting that while male political bloggers are known as "political" bloggers, women are more often known as "feminist" bloggers. "There's this rich and broad feminist blogosphere, which is heavily female and very political, but considered a different sort of animal. Is Jill Filipovic a political blogger? Ann Friedman?" he says. Male bloggers are seen as talking about politics with a universal point of view, but when we women bring our perspective to the field, it's seen as as a minority opinion.

Rachel Lucas responds in some detail, but I particularly liked this response to the passage quoted above:

I clicked on the hyperlinks of both those names to decide for myself if they were "political" and not "feminist" bloggers, and in so doing, I discovered the names of their actual blogs. And I shit you not, these two blogs, which it is apparently so very wrong to label "feminist," are called:

Feministing.com

and

Feministe.us

Bam. Game over, pal. You lose.

It's like trying to claim that John Hawkins is unfairly labeled a "right wing news blogger," and then providing a link to his site, which is called RIGHT WING NEWS. Sure, he writes about things other than right wing news, and those female bloggers write about things other than feminism and even women in general, but not a lot.

Plus, as Rachel Lucas points out, how do you ask "Why are all the big political bloggers men?" and miss Michelle Malkin? And if you mention some of the somewhat lower-traffic but still prominent bloggers, why ignore Megan McArdle and Ann Althouse (an omniblogger, but with a good deal of political and policy content)?

Thanks to InstaPundit for the pointer.

Brian Leiter Understands Academic Freedom

And here he demonstrates that Paul Campos does not.

One point that Leiter makes is particularly worth repeating:

There is lots of speculation that maybe what Yoo did (writing the torture memos) constitutes a crime or legal malpractice. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't: it is unclear based on the available facts (though, on both counts, the available facts strongly suggest a negative answer, especially as to malpractice). It is not for the University of California at Berkeley to investigate crimes or investigate legal malpractice of its faculty, based on speculations that are, quite clearly in most cases, driven by those who find Yoo's views morally odious. Universities have no competence to carry out such investigations . . . and the mere prospect of such investigations would chill academic work on controversial matters almost totally.

If an institution actually charged with investigating crimes or legal malpractice--e.g., a prosecutor, a court, a congressional committee, a bar disciplinary committee--were to conduct a proper investigation and issue a finding of misconduct that would surely then be grounds for the university to open a disciplinary proceeding. But as things stand, there are no such grounds. . . . most of those chattering about "possible" crimes and malpractice soon make it clear that what they really want is for John Yoo to be punished for his ideas and for the fact that some government officials may have acted on those ideas. That's a standard that violates the First Amendment rights of state university faculty and betrays the moral ideal of academic freedom.

The House of Lords on Speech "With Which One May Not Be Sympathetic":

The House of Lords decision I discuss below rejected a free speech claim brought by an animal rights group, but in the process reasoned this way (paragraph break added):

In the present case also the proposed advertisement is wholly inoffensive, and one may be sympathetic to the appellant's aims or some of them. But the issue must be tested with reference to objects with which one may not be sympathetic.

Hypothetical examples spring readily to mind: adverts by well-endowed multi-national companies seeking to thwart or delay action on climate change; adverts by wealthy groups seeking to ban abortion; or, if not among member states of the Council of Europe, adverts by so-called patriotic groups supporting the right of the citizen to bear arms. Parliament was entitled to regard the risk of such adverts as a real danger, none the less so because legislation has up to now prevented its occurrence.

Now I can sympathize with a judge who is just trying to point out that the free speech claim could be raised as to controversial speech as well as less controversial speech — or even trying to point out to liberal readers that the law would apply to conservative speech as well as liberal speech. But is it just me, or is there a pretty distinct tone of personal disapproval with regard to the examples?

The right to bear arms, in the example, wouldn't just be raised by someone; it would be raised by "so-called patriotic groups." "So-called" in this context sounds pretty pejorative, no? The multi-national companies wouldn't just be expressing their views; they'd be seeking to "thwart or delay action," again seemingly something of a pejorative characterization (though not as clearly so as "so-called," I think). And all this speech would be "a real danger."

Now naturally the judges are entitled to their own views about the merits of those who would support the right of the citizens to bear arms. But this just highlights my point, I think: The approach the court upholds, while ostensibly aimed at equality and "level[ing]" "the playing field of debate," simply entrenches elite opinion. Elite judges are worried about "so-called patriotic groups" and attempts to "thwart or delay action." I expect that opinion among the broadcasting elites includes the same or similar prejudices. Groups with outsider views can only get into the broadcaster programs with the broadcasting elite's permission; and when they try to pay money instead, the political and judicial elites keep them from doing that, all in the name of leveling.

And one more thing, why just in countries outside the Council of Europe? Wouldn't citizens of the Council of Europe — even "so-called patriotic groups" of such citizens — be entitled to argue for the right to bear arms, at least if the law allowed them to spending money for such "danger[ous]" activity?

UPDATE: Commenter Virginia reminded me of a passage that also struck me, but that I then forgot to stress in this post:

Nor is [a level playing field of debate] achieved if well-endowed interests which are not political parties are able to use the power of the purse to give enhanced prominence to views which may be true or false, attractive to progressive minds or unattractive, beneficial or injurious.
What's this with "progressive minds"? Is there some good justification for the judges to treat "attractive to progressive minds" as parallel to "true" or "beneficial," which is to say to assume that a "progressive mind" is good and a mind that's skeptical about progress is bad? Or is "progressive mind" in Britain a term that's unrelated to politics, and equally applicable to left-wing minds and right-wing ones? (I recognize the latter might well be possible; please let me know if it is indeed so.)

Buying Property: How to exchange US Dollars For Brazilian Reals

Hopefully, someone can help. About a week ago, I sent a fair amount of money to Brazil via a bank wire transfer to buy a property.

Let’s call it $100,000 just to make it easy. It turns out that you need all this documentation just to release the money into my wife’s bank account. After putting it all together, the Bank here in Brazil tells us that the buy rate for brazilian reals is 1.67.

So my $100,000 would buy 167,000 Reals.

Their sell rate is 1.79. Meaning I would need to pay 179,000 Reals to buy $100,000 US.

The spot rate on the exchange markets today is 1.739.
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=USDBRL=X

with a bid of 1.739 and an ask of 1.740.

That means that the bank is charging 4% BEFORE fees to exchange the money.

I told them to send the money back to my US account.

There has to be a better way.

I’ve been Googling and calling different places for the last 2 hours. Forex.com said of the brazilian Reals "we don’t deal with exotic currencies like that". Exotic? It’s the 5th largest country on the planet!

All of the Currency exchange specialists seem to be based out of the UK (maybe it has something to do with the term?). I called HiFX and the guy on the phone says "I know we have it on our website, but we don’t deal with brazilian Reals."

WTF?!?

The idea of being raped for thousands of dollars just to exchange my money makes me sick to my stomach. It’s not that $5,000 or $10,000 one way or the other changes my quality of life, it’s just the principle of the matter. I worked hard to make this money and paying that much to exchange money is just wrong on a gut level.

I need a solution.

If you can find me a solution so I can exchange $100,000 or more US dollars for Brazilian reals in one transaction for something much closer to market rates (like around 1.73ish) and without a hefty commission, I’ll send you $100 via paypal.

Give More Tomorrow and Choice Architecture

Libertarian paternalists and behavioral economists are enthusiastic about the Save More Tomorrow plan, by which employees agree that some portion of their future wage increases will go to savings. Save More Tomorrow helps overcome the two behavioral obstacles of loss aversion and inertia. The plan is making it more likely that many thousands of Americans will have more comfortable retirements.

Those of us who like Save More Tomorrow do not want to require private or public employers to offer the plan. But we hope that it will be made increasingly available as a nudge.

Richard Thaler and I think that it is possible to build on Save More Tomorrow. In Nudge, we observe that many people have strong charitable impulses, and they give less than they might because of inertia. Many of us decide, at one or another time, that we ought to give more, but we fail to do so because time passes and we focus on other things.

A Give More Tomorrow plan might help. The basic idea is to ask people whether they would like to donate a small amount to their favorite charities in the near future, and then agree to increase their donations every year. Such a plan might even be offered through the workplace, in which employers and employees might agree to devote a small percentage of future wage increases to charity. A pilot Give More Tomorrow experiment, conducted by Amy Bremen, has found some exceedingly promising results.

There is a larger point here. Often private and public institutions seek to alter behavior by changing material incentives (sometimes, in the case of government, at taxpayer expense). But the most effective approaches sometimes put material incentives to one side and change what Thaler and I call "choice architecture," which is the background against which people make their decisions. Good choice architects maintain liberty while also making it easy for us, and for what Lincoln called the "better angels" of our nature, to do what we would like to do.

Why Should Not Lead to Endless Litigation:

I was interested to see over at Capital Defense Weekly that Deborah Denno and other death penalty critics expect Baze v. Rees to lead to lots of additional capital litigation. I tend to disagree. To see why, let's take a look at the key passage of Baze in Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion:
The alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. If a State refuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current method of execution, then a State's refusal to change its method can be viewed as "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. . . . A stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain. He must show that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives. A State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this standard.
  As I read this passage, the existing three-drug protocol is constitutional unless the defendant both demonstrates a substantial risk of pain in his own case and also proves that there is a "feasible, readily implemented" alternative that "in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain." That means that if a court holds a protocol unconstitutional, it can't do so in the abstract: It has to say exactly what procedure can replace it.

  The requirement that the defendant prove a specific alternative should effectively keep Baze from generating endless litigation. It will force defendants to argue a very specific alternative: Don't kill me like that, kill me like this. If a state wants to litigate the issue and loses, the court will not enjoin the execution but rather will just order the state to execute the person in the different but also "feasible" and "readily implemented" way the defendant has proposed. And the state always has the option of eliminating the issue as a delay tactic: It can always cut off the litigation by just agreeing to the defendant's alternative method of execution.

  This is quite different from method-of-execution claims brought before Baze. In the past, the idea was that the three-drug protocol was unconstitutional but what should replace it was left open. Instead of having a specific alternative, the court was supposed to spend months or even years of study and hearings to determine what should replace it (during which there would be a moratorium on executions). This made states dig in their heels: They had no incentive to change their protocols because the defendants would just claim that the new standard was also unconstitutional.

  That's no longer true post-Baze. Win or lose, the states will have a specific protocol to follow and the executions will go forward.

From Equality-Based Restrictions on Campaign Advertising to Equality-Based Restrictions on Other Kinds of Speech?

1. One problem with the "equalization" argument for campaign finance restrictions — especially those applied to independent spending by individuals or organizations — is that their logic reaches considerably beyond campaigns. If fairness concerns justify barring expensive speech aimed at backing or defeating a candidate or ballot measure, why not speech aimed at supporting or opposing broader ideological views (whether abortion rights, gun rights, health care reform, or whatever else)?

After all, changes in public attitudes about issues may quickly affect candidates and ballot measures. More broadly, if broader "constitutional values," such as democratic self-government, justify restraining the spending of some to "level the playing field," one would think that these values would have the same effect in all aspects of democratic self-government — and First Amendment law has of course recognized that rights of "democratic self-government" extend to opinion formation generally and not just to election campaigns.

We see the same when we look at some of the rhetoric of those who would support broad campaign finance speech restrictions. For instance, Justice Stevens justifies his position in favor upholding such restrictions on the grounds that "money is property; it is not speech," and

Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results.

Exactly the same argument would apply to political debate generally, and not just election campaigns. (Justice Stevens does try to limit his argument by suggesting that spending might be protected by broader property rights "unrelated to the First Amendment," and by suggesting that his argument wouldn't apply when "the prohibition entirely forecloses a channel of communication"; yet constitutional property rights, especially outside the right to compensation for physical takings, are notoriously weak compared to the First Amendment, and many restrictions could dramatically affect public debate without entirely foreclosing some medium.) Arguments focused on the risk of corrupting politicians through implicit quid pro quo would not apply quite as sharply, but Justice Stevens is obviously going beyond that.

Likewise, Justice Breyer's and Ginsburg's argument for "balanc[ing] interests" where "constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation" — which Justice Breyer applies to election campaign speech — would apply to pre-campaign speech about public issues as well. If "by limiting the size of the largest contributions, [campaign-related] restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process," then by limiting expensive speech on broader public issues, these broader restrictions would aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the opinion-forming process, and thus indirectly the electoral process. (More on this here.) And of course many of the past and present arguments in favor of the Fairness Doctrine have explicitly urged equality and fairness as justification in favor of coercive regulations related to public debate broadly (regulations that imposed expensive obligations on stations that carried controversial speech, in order to ensure supposedly fair treatment for rival speech).

2. The reason I mention all this now is I just read a remarkable implementation of this very sort of broad speech-restrictive approach, in last month's House of Lords Decision in R v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. English law, it turns out, bans all paid "religious or political" advertising on television and radio — and the House of Lords upheld this ban, precisely on the sorts of equality grounds I described above. And this ban is not at all limited to political campaigns; the loser in the court decision was a pro-animal-rights group that wanted to run a "My Mate's a Primate" campaign aimed at "directing public attention towards the use of primates by humans and the threat presented by such use to the survival of primates." (I take it "mate" was used in the British/Commonwealth sense of "friend.")

What was the rationale? The same sort of equality argument that we see commonly made about election-related speech in America:

[I]t is highly desirable that the playing field of debate should be so far as practicable level. This is achieved where, in public discussion, differing views are expressed, contradicted, answered and debated.... It is not achieved if political parties can, in proportion to their resources, buy unlimited opportunities to advertise in the most effective media, so that elections become little more than an auction. Nor is it achieved if well-endowed interests which are not political parties are able to use the power of the purse to give enhanced prominence to views which may be true or false, attractive to progressive minds or unattractive, beneficial or injurious. The risk is that objects which are essentially political may come to be accepted by the public not because they are shown in public debate to be right but because, by dint of constant repetition, the public has been conditioned to accept them. The rights of others which a restriction on the exercise of the right to free expression may properly be designed to protect must, in my judgment, include a right to be protected against the potential mischief of partial political advertising.

Now of course the court assures us that there are still "other media ... open to the appellant: newspapers and magazines, direct mailshots, billboards, public meetings and marches." But the court also says (as a justification for the selective ban on radio and television advertising) that "there is a pressing social need for a blanket prohibition of political advertising on television and radio" because of "the greater immediacy and impact of television and radio advertising." So people are free to use other media, but precisely because those media are less effective.

Likewise, the court assures us that "It is the duty of broadcasters to achieve [the] object [of providing for expression of differing views] by presenting balanced programmes in which all lawful views may be ventilated." But that of course just means that public debate is within the power of the media elites that run broadcasters, and that run the government agencies that can pressure broadcasters. Outsider organizations are locked out, unable to broadcast their views the way they choose to express them.

Interestingly, the House of Lords here departs from a 2001 European Court of Human Rights decision that held that bans on political broadcast advertising were indeed unconstitutional.

3. Moreover, one of the judges specifically tied the argument to her rejection of the American free speech model, as exemplified in Buckley v. Valeo:

There was an elephant in the committee room, always there but never mentioned, when we heard this case. It was the dominance of advertising, not only in elections but also in the formation of political opinion, in the United States of America. Enormous sums are spent, and therefore have to be raised, at election times: it is estimated that the disputed 2000 elections for President and Congress cost as much as US$3 billion. Attempts to regulate campaign spending are struck down in the name of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press": see particularly Buckley v [Valeo], 424 US 1 (1976). A fortiori there is no limit to the amount that pressure groups can spend on getting their message across in the most powerful and pervasive media available.

In the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe, we do not want our government or its policies to be decided by the highest spenders. Our democracy is based upon more than one person one vote. It is based on the view that each person has equal value. "Within the sphere of democratic politics, we confront each other as moral equals" (Ackerman and Ayres, Voting with Dollars, 2003, p 12). We want everyone to be able to make up their own minds on the important issues of the day. For this we need the free exchange of information and ideas. We have to accept that some people have greater resources than others with which to put their views across. But we want to avoid the grosser distortions which unrestricted access to the broadcast media will bring.

So this case is not just about permissible restrictions on freedom of expression. It is about striking the right balance between the two most important components of a democracy: freedom of expression and voter equality....

So the English judge — and I expect her colleagues as well — saw the connection between the equality rationale for restricting expensive campaign-related speech and the equality rationale for restricting expensive speech more broadly. She flatly rejected Buckley's approach to campaign-related speech. ("There are aspects of the ban on broadcasting political advertisements which no-one disputes: in particular, advertising by candidates for election, or by political parties, whether or not at election times.") And she went from there to rejecting free speech protection for payments for issue-oriented speech more broadly.

So if you're skeptical that the progression I outlined in item 1 would indeed take place in America, keep in mind what has happened in England.